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From 7-9 July 2009, government officials, civilian analysts, military officers, academics, 
and security experts gathered at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School for the sixth annual 
Monterey Proliferation Seminar. The seminar addressed the topic of ―Proliferation 
Complexity: The Intersection of Policy, Operations, Media, Intelligence, and Science.‖ 
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 
(DTRA-ASCO) sponsored the event, which was hosted by the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s (NPS) Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC) in cooperation with the James 
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). 
This report is intended to serve as an aide memoir for participants of the conference, and 
presents the range of issues discussed and the nature of those discussions. The conference 
was held under the ―Chatham House Rule,‖ meaning that individuals spoke on a not-for-
attribution basis, in order to encourage lively discussion and debate. The report therefore 
does not include all presentations, particularly those that contained classified material. 
Panel summaries are intended to provide an overall sense of the discussion topics, but do 
not comprehensively address the topics discussed or indicate agreement on the listed 
topics amongst conference participants. Two graduate students from the James Martin 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Daniel Cunningham and Daniel Johnson, were the 
rapporteurs for the conference and compiled this report. 
The conference focused on five functional areas, and each panel adopted an 
interdisciplinary approach by incorporating presentations by experts with varied 
backgrounds. Presenters spoke for approximately twenty minutes each, with a question 
and answer period following the conclusion of each panel. The meeting began with 
opening remarks by Dr. James Wirtz, Dean of the School of International Graduate 
Studies at NPS, Mr. James Russell, Senior Lecturer in the Department of National 
Security Affairs at NPS, Dr. William Potter, Director of CNS, and Dr. Mike Wheeler, 
Director of DTRA-ASCO. 
These speakers observed the following about the conference: 
   DTRA is celebrating its 10th anniversary. DTRA’s think tank, ASCO, is trying to 
find solutions for some of the most intractable problems in nonproliferation.  
   The focus of the conference is both timely and important due to the recent Russian 
Summit, the upcoming NPT Review Conference, the Obama administration's 
commitment to nonproliferation and global zero, North Korean and Iranian 
proliferation concerns, Cooperative Threat Reduction developments, and the 
growth of informal approaches to nonproliferation such as the Proliferation 
Security Initiative. 
    NPS's CCC is a bridge between the intelligence community, the academic world, 
and the fleet. The Strategic Insights website receives 40,000 hits per month, most 
of which go to the quarterly journal publication. 
    CNS is a leading global repository on nonproliferation. Many nonproliferation 
experts come from CNS, and Monterey Institute students studying at CNS receive 
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interdisciplinary training in nonproliferation. 
   Original nonproliferation ideas are needed to combat new threats. To explore new 
ideas the list of presenters is a who's who in nonproliferation, with a diverse 
audience from the  operational, intelligence, scientific, academic, and media 
communities. 
The introductory speakers also laid out the following conference themes: 
 How do we address the role of nonproliferation in a changing strategic 
environment? 
 Nonproliferation requires the integration of multiple disciplines into the field. 
Language specialists, lawyers, intelligence agents, and academia all have equally 
important roles. Students and professionals should have training in multiple fields.  
 Experts are expected to study very specific areas and can become stuck in their 
"silos". Each field develops different protocols and adheres to different standards. 
This conference is an opportunity to "mix it up" and meet someone outside of 
your discipline in order to learn how he or she thinks. 
 Time is precious for senior officials in government. Therefore, nonproliferation 

















II. Conference Summary Report  
 
This report attempts to present the range of issues discussed at the conference titled 
Proliferation Complexity: The Intersection of Policy, Operations, Media, Intelligence, 
and Science, and identifies a number of central themes. It does not intend to capture the 
exhaustive list of proposals and comments made by its participants, nor does it claim to 




   Omniviolence and violence interdependence have altered the international 
relations theory debate. The argument was presented that prior to 11th 
September 2001, international relations theory held that states were perceived as 
the primary actors in international affairs. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 
the United States and the anthrax letters, a second great debate began and Cold 
War-era positions on international relations theory changed. The new debate has 
three characteristics: 1) Deterrence is wounded since it is more difficult to deter 
non-state actors; 2) The world is no longer state centered; and 3) The threat to 
political liberty is now part of the debate. Growing violence interdependence—
technological changes that increase the potential destructive power of violence—
further influence the new debate. A world with both nuclear weapons and 
terrorism leads to a high level of violence interdependence, resulting in a 
hierarchy among states, which leads to despotism and anarchy.  
 
   In order to escape anarchy, states must move toward a modified one world 
constitutional government. Current solutions to escaping anarchy are still stuck 
in realist and liberal mindsets, effectively projecting the hierarchical form of the 
state onto the world level. The theory of republicanism encompasses and eclipses 
both realism and liberalism, offering a solution called negarchy—an authoritative 
yet constrained position between anarchy and hierarchy. Negarchy can be 
achieved through the formation of a one world constitutionalist government, 
which would prevent a dramatic increase of unit level hierarchy and preserve 
political liberty.  
 
 A one world government is not inevitable. Someone asked what happens if 
proliferation and omniviolence stop. In that case, it was argued that there is no 
need to exit anarchy and form a one world government. In order to reach that 
scenario, the world would need a nuclear control regime with a thickening of 
institutional control. The regime must be generalized globally through use of best 









Focus Area #1: Diplomatic Approaches to Proliferation: What Works, What Doesn't 
 
   The United States must lead in formal and informal arms control and 
nonproliferation arrangements if they are to be successful. An argument was 
presented that the Bush administration neglected legal approaches to arms control 
and nonproliferation, and that U.S. leadership is needed if progress is to be made 
at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and 
with additional CTBT ratifications. If the United States and other NWS move 
toward fulfilling their disarmament obligations under article VI of the NPT, this 
will help convince other states to cooperate with nonproliferation initiatives and 
place the United States in a better position to facilitate a successful 2010 NPT 
Review Conference. 
 
   Details on counting for the new START treaty will be difficult to resolve. The 
new treaty calls for 1,500-1,600 warheads contained within 500-1,100 strategic 
launchers, and someone argued that this pattern of setting ranges in treaties is a 
bad practice. It was also noted that the current START treaty counts the ability to 
deliver warheads instead of the actual number of warheads, meaning strategic 
weapons that carry conventional warheads are counted under START. The United 
States will try to exclude conventional strategic weapons from counting while 
Russia will try to include them, in order to constrain the U.S.’s stronger 
conventional strategic forces. In addition, there is disagreement on preserving the 
telemetry encryption ban and determining upload potential.  
 
   Informal regimes provide an avenue for arms control outside of formal 
approaches. A move toward informal approaches to arms control is taking place, 
as exemplified by the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), UN Security Council Resolution 1540 
(UNSCR 1540), the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), and the preliminary 
negotiations for the Moscow Treaty. These arrangements may offer greater speed 
and flexibility, but may also lack an underlying legal mechanism. One participant 
questioned whether informal mechanisms would be harder to implement at the 
domestic politics level because they would lack the status of treaty law. The 
discussion indicated this may not always be the case, as domestic consensus on 
the need for proliferation prevention in countries such as the United States means 
that informal mechanisms can complement existing legal measures rather than 
conflicting with them.  
 
   Myths or misconceptions may surround informal approaches to arms control. 
The argument was presented that three such "myths" exist: that informal 
approaches undermine traditional regimes; that informal approaches are 
inherently weaker than formal, legally binding structures; and that informal 
approaches are new inventions. The argument was advanced that informal 
approaches support and compliment traditional regimes because they are more 
flexible and responsive to the adapting characteristics of proliferators. In addition, 
it was argued that informal nonproliferation mechanisms have existed at least 
6 
 
since the Australia Group formed in the mid-1980s.  
 
   Although the CD plays an important role in arms control and 
nonproliferation, it has encountered serious obstacles. The CD is not a UN 
body and controls its own rules and agenda, highlighted by a ten-item Decalogue 
of goals for disarmament. It was argued that because negotiators refuse to adjust 
the Decalogue goals for fear of losing ground in the disarmament fight, consensus 
and progress within the CD are difficult to obtain. In addition, members' 
frustration has grown due to the use of veto power by CD members, highlighted 
by the difficulty in advancing the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). 
However, there was a recent positive development at the CD when North Korea 
did not object to the 29 May 2009 adoption of the program of work.  
 
   Reporters play a role in the nonproliferation regime by exposing both good 
and bad information. It was asserted that there are three tempering factors in 
media reporting of proliferation issues: reporters must dumb down information for 
the public; they tend to be overwhelmed by the volume of work; and good 
reporters are a vanishing breed. Quite often, reporters' sources are selective leaks 
from government insiders. Sometimes this information is good, exemplified by 
the Vinca HEU removal case. When the information is bad, as highlighted by the 
Iraq aluminum tubes case, the media also have a chance to correct the record by 
exposing false and misleading information. Ultimately, reporters require good 
sources and not all news outlets and journalists are equally capable of accurately 
covering complex proliferation issues. 
 
 
Focus Area #2: Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation: Approaches, Problems, Past 
Lessons 
 
   The history of the accuracy of proliferation forecasting is a mixed bag. It was 
argued that, historically, forecasting vertical proliferation has been reasonably 
accurate, and that forecasting horizontal proliferation since Chinese acquisition of 
nuclear weapons has also been relatively accurate. However, there were surprises, 
including the extent of vertical proliferation that took place between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the underestimation of 
Iraq's weaponization progress prior to the First Gulf War, the overestimation of 
Iraq's progress leading to the 2003 U.S. invasion, and the 1998 Indian nuclear 
test.  
 
   Forecasting after national shocks typically results in worst-case scenarios. It 
was contended that after the Sputnik launch, proliferation estimates were inflated 
and might have been influenced by the alarmist mood of public figures. After 
9/11, worst case scenarios proliferated again due to a lack of moderating voices, 
possibly leading to the pre-Iraq war intelligence misestimates. Another panelist 
expressed concerns that NIE estimates are now too cautious. This participant 
believed that Iraq war overestimates, and the subsequent political fallout resulted 
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in a pendulum swing from being too aggressive to being too conservative.  
 
   The nuclear renaissance may lead to nuclear proliferation and/or nuclear 
terrorism. It was pointed out that aspiring entrants into the nuclear power club 
generally possess a less developed infrastructure and have higher corruption 
indices compared to current nuclear power countries. In addition, six of the states 
interested in acquiring nuclear power are on the top-ten list of countries with the 
highest number of terrorist incidences. In order to manage the nonproliferation 
challenges of new countries possessing nuclear power plants, it was argued that 
supplier states must utilize prospective states' participation in nonproliferation 
arrangements as preconditions for support. In addition, if states withdraw from the 
NPT they should be required to return the nuclear material they obtained through 
participation in the treaty back to its supplier.  
 
    Expectations for what intelligence can predict may be unrealistic. It was 
contended that the Intelligence Community (IC) is held to a higher forecasting 
standard than are experts in other fields such as economics, even though the 
information available to the intelligence community is limited by the fact that 
states closely guard their nuclear secrets. The public does not make this 
connection, however, and believes the IC is broken due to 11 September and the 
lack of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. It was argued that despite public 
assumptions, the IC is not broken and does not need fixing. Several participants 
agreed that there is a danger in trying to "fix" the IC because doing so may 
remove the latitude analysts need to make predictions.  
 
   The role of NIE estimates has changed. One participant claimed that during the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, NIE estimates drove diplomatic initiatives, 
and were hugely consequential in the formation of the NPT, the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty, and engagement with the Soviet Union on arms control efforts. Post Cold 
War they have been used to prompt military instead of diplomatic engagement, 
raising the stakes for the consequences of inaccurate estimates.  Another 
participant argued that there is a damaging misnomer that the IC is in the business 
of providing "actionable" intelligence. 
 
   Current theoretical models and forecasting vocabulary cannot completely 
and accurately explain proliferation. The argument was advanced that although 
basic models, such as realism, are helpful in explaining state behavior, no 
proliferation "chain theory" is completely supported on a historical basis. Security 
by itself, for example, is not a sufficient reason for states to seek nuclear weapons 
because not all states that face high-level security threats pursue nuclear weapons. 
Additionally, "doomsday" vocabulary is abundant within the nonproliferation 
field. Terms such as "tipping point‖ and "cascade" make proliferation seem 
inevitable and irreversible, but this is not objectively supported.   
 
   The distinction between hedging and latency is debatable. Participants 
disagreed on the relative importance of hedging and latency, with one participant 
8 
 
claiming there is a significant difference between Iran’s deliberate efforts to 
reduce the time it would require to produce a nuclear weapon, and Japanese 
latency. Another participant argued that policymakers care little for this 
distinction and are more concerned with a specific technical timeline. One person 
argued, however, that intentions matter and ―good guys‖ do not proliferate, 
although another disputed the criteria for classifying "good" versus "bad" guys.   
 
 
Focus Area #3: Verifying Nonproliferation and Arms Control Agreements 
 
   The Additional Protocol (AP) has provided greater authorities to the IAEA in 
certain countries, but it has failed to strengthen the overall compliance 
system because so many states have refused to adopt it. The revelation of 
Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in the early 1990s demonstrated that the IAEA 
needed more teeth for its inspections program and led to the development and 
adoption of the AP. Yet attitudes surrounding the necessity of the AP continue to 
vary among states. Some states, pointing to Article III of the NPT, feel strongly 
that ratification of the AP should be mandatory. Other states are wary of the tool 
and believe steps must be voluntary. One participant also argued that the AP's 
effectiveness is unproven, even though the implementation of other strengthened 
safeguards has proven helpful in revealing nuclear activities in Egypt, South 
Korea and Syria. The AP has not yet enabled discovery of the most worrisome 
undeclared nuclear activities, such as a covert weapons programs, perhaps 
because countries with such programs refuse to adopt the AP. 
 
   The International Monitoring System (IMS) has improved considerably since 
the 1999 U.S. debate over CTBT ratification. One participant claimed that the 
IMS, which is typically used for geological purposes, can pick up explosions as 
small as a truck bomb and can differentiate among earthquakes, implosions, and 
explosions. The IMS easily picked up the DPRK tests in 2006 and 2009, which 
was an improvement from the lower sensitivity exhibited by the system during the 
Indian and Pakistani tests in May 1998. Nevertheless, the most important form of 
monitoring continues to be on-site monitoring, which will not be possible unless 
the CTBT enters into force, and even then in only limited circumstances.  
 
   The CTBT verification regime may not be able to secure on-site inspections. 
A participant argued that securing on-site inspections through the CTBT regime 
will require too much evidence, and that the burden of proof will therefore be too 
high to successfully secure an affirmative vote from 31 out of the 51 states on the 
oversight body. This participant also worried that states could be charged with 
requesting an unfair inspection. One person presented a counter-argument that 
improvements in the IMS over the last ten years have increased its viability as a 
confidence-building tool. Another argued that if there is a suspected nuclear test, 





   Transparency is not a substitute for monitoring. There is a debate as to what 
extent transparency measures are substitutes for monitoring measures. One 
participant asserted that as with other arms control arrangements, one should 
follow the axiom of trust, but verify. Therefore monitoring, or the gathering of 
relevant information to assure compliance, must be routine in cooperative 
measures and agreements.  
 
   Determining whether noncompliance has occurred requires judgment. When 
a state is in noncompliance, even in a perfect regime, the international community 
or a designated body must make the distinction between intentional and 
unintentional activities. A participant asserted that South Korea's nuclear 
activities, for example, were judged as unintentional and therefore resulted in no 
punishment. Cases of intentional violation, such as North Korea, are direct 
challenges to verification and require punitive responses. 
 
   Some participants worried that the CTBT could negatively impact the 
reliability of the U.S. deterrent. One person stated that the CTBT is a major 
constraint on the U.S. ability to maintain the reliability of its nuclear deterrent. 
Another participant countered that the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) was 
relatively new at the time of the 1999 Senate CTBT rejection, and that the SSP 
has since improved confidence in the nuclear stockpile and eliminated the need 
for testing 
 
   A strategy for CTBT ratification is needed. A participant noted that although 33 
countries still have not signed the CTBT, of the 44 countries with significant 
nuclear activity, all but nine have ratified. Therefore, the strategy for bringing in 
the remaining nuclear countries relies heavily on U.S. ratification of the treaty. If 
the United States ratified the treaty, China and Indonesia would be more likely to 
ratify, which would pressure Iran and other holdouts as the number of non-ratified 
countries became smaller and smaller. Another person noted that more difficult 
cases, such as North Korea, could potentially be circumvented by utilization of a 
legal mechanism that enables a treaty to be brought into force despite the non-
ratification of one or two holdouts. Another individual said that the political value 
of decreasing the likelihood that Iran would test a nuclear weapon should be 
leveraged to convince holdouts to ratify the CTBT.  
 
 
Focus Area #4: Attribution; Figuring Out Who Done It 
 
  Nuclear forensics is not foolproof. An individual observed that there is a myth 
within the media that we have the capability to easily accomplish attribution 
through forensics, whereas forensics may provide insufficient data for attribution 
of an event. Due to this misconception, scientists must convey the limitations of 
forensics to policymakers, so that they will not expect to be able to base their 
policy decisions exclusively on forensics. Another participant raised the concern 
that international cooperation on nuclear forensics is nonexistent due to 
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classification. Participants also debated the validity of scenarios in which a state 
could "spoof" another state's weapons or fissile materials, and hinder the accurate 
investigation of a nuclear incident. 
 
 Forensic attribution is different from the political and legal attribution of a 
WMD event. A participant asserted that a country may be able to forensically 
attribute a WMD event, but may be unable to do so politically or legally. 
Although science is an important contributor to attribution—political decision-
making and prosecution will not be possible without it—science alone is not 
sufficient. The accuracy, reliability, and credibility of the evidence must all be 
taken into account before a political decision is made.  
 
   Government agencies will follow different processes during the pre-
detonation and post-detonation phases. It was presented that the pre-detonation 
phase would move at normal law enforcement and intelligence timescales and 
would not be handled publicly. The post-detonation phase would focus on 
characterizing and understanding the type of device used and would, conversely, 
be processed publicly. Successful attribution will require interagency 
collaboration: the IC must deliver information quickly, the FBI and DOD must 
expedite access to the site and provide transportation and a chain of custody for 
samples, and the national labs must operate on a 24/7 basis. Preparation requires 
regularly exercising all of the component programs, including an institutionalized 
review and feedback process similar to war-gaming. Preventing a second event 
would be paramount. 
 
   States will fall back on legal standards when making attribution. An 
individual outlined three major issues that must be addressed when making 
attribution at a state level: evidence and inference, sovereignty, and legitimacy. 
Military and foreign partners, however, work in different legal systems and this 
will cause complications. In addition, a participant noted that evidence (which 
may be classified) would have to follow the Daubert Standard, meaning it must be 
scientifically reliable, accurate, and rest on a strong foundation.  
 
   Attribution efforts will be complicated by international politics. Someone 
claimed that the process of attribution lacks effective international legal recourse. 
UNSCR 1540 does not have an enforcement mechanism, and as a result, 
unilateral action becomes a likely response. This will raise questions of 
sovereignty, and make it difficult to convince key international players to side 
with the prosecuting government. A participant also argued that a policymaker 
might decide not to make an attribution, despite forensic evidence, because it 
could be strategically unacceptable. 
 
   The media has a special role in the attribution process. It was asserted that the 
media must question regular and well-established sources in the case of a nuclear 
explosion. Saturation media coverage, with visual images and no media in the 
actual area of the event, could result in misleading information. This could 
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therefore pressure decision-makers to prematurely respond or retaliate. A 
participant also observed that terrorists could claim attribution and threaten to 
attack another city every day or week. In this way terrorists could control the 
timeline of response and influence decision-making, possibly resulting in 
cascading ramifications including spontaneous urban evacuations.  
 
 
Focus Area #5: Cooperative Threat Reduction: Prospects for Internationalizing the 
Program 
 
   Participants debated whether CTR should be “re-branded” to overcome 
stereotypes in recipient countries that it is a U.S.-dominated foreign aid 
program. Some participants argued that the CTR name is tarnished, and should 
be changed to help facilitate a new model of genuinely collaborative CTR. 
However, other participants felt that the CTR name is essential for continued U.S. 
congressional support of the program, as there is remarkably bipartisan support 
for programs labeled as ―CTR.‖  
 
   To sustain CTR, the United States must apply the lessons it has learned over 
the history of the program. It was proposed that the United States transform its 
donor relationships into collaborative partnerships. It is important to get local 
buy-ins; people are afraid to have radioactive wastes transported or imported into 
their area. Another participant claimed that NGOs could help because they 
understand the situation on the ground, often have better access, and provide a 
less bureaucratically oriented role. A panelist also noted that there is a strong need 
for a reduction in the turnover of U.S. government personnel involved in CTR, 
and an increase in personnel possessing relevant area and language skills. 
 
   The United States must use law as a tool for obtaining policy objectives. 
Someone asserted that the United States is cognizant of using law from a 
defensive perspective, for example in its opposition to the International Criminal 
Court, yet neglects the use of law for offensive purposes. A participant argued 
that this is unfortunate, because law can be used to advance national security. For 
example, Treasury Department sanctions against companies doing business with 
Iran and North Korea have been powerful coercive tools.  
 
   Legal disputes have occasionally ground CTR to a halt. An individual said that 
the House Armed Services Committee adopted several recommendations in the 
2010 NDAA to remedy these problems. The person claimed that if these ideas are 
implemented it will result in a more agile, flexible, and responsive CTR capable 
of building sustaining relationships. These remedies are: 
o Grant congressional funding for CTR by utilizing limited notwithstanding 
authority. 
o Address the lack of co-mingling authority. Checks for CTR should be 
routed to CTR instead of into the general fund, thus making them exempt 
from the Miscellaneous Receipts Act. 
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o Reassess the CTR umbrella protection provision agreements that have 
made it difficult to reach liability agreements with foreign governments. 
 
   The future of the CTR biological weapons (BW) program is in doubt. It was 
presented that a number of very large BW facilities in the Russian Ministry of 
Defense (MoD) never became a part of the CTR Program. Although CTR in the 
biosector in Russia is now nearly unworkable, the individual noted some 
successes in addressing low bio-security and safety levels in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. The future of the CTR program in Iraq, however, looks bleak: few 
scientists will go there for training. It was also recommended that BW CTR be 
transferred to DHHS or the CDC, which would have better prospects of eliciting 
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